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Call Center Outsourcing Contract Analysis and Choice

O. Zeynep Akin, Francis de Véricourt, Fikri Karaesmen

College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Koç University, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 34450
Department of Industrial Engineering, Koç University, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey
zaksin{at}ku.edu.tr
fdv1{at}mail.duke.edu
fkaraesmen{at}ku.edu.tr

This paper considers a call center outsourcing contract analysis and choice problem faced by a contractor and a service provider. The service provider receives an uncertain call volume over multiple periods and is considering outsourcing all or part of these calls to a contractor. Each call brings in a fixed revenue to the service provider. Answering calls requires having service capacity; thus implicit in the outsourcing decision is a capacity decision. Insufficient capacity implies that calls cannot be answered, which in turn means there will be a revenue loss. Faced with a choice between a volume-based and a capacity-based contract offered by a contractor that has pricing power, the service provider determines optimal capacity levels. The optimal price and capacity of the contractor together with the optimal capacity of the service provider determine optimal profits of each party under the two contracts being considered. This paper characterizes optimal capacity levels and partially characterizes optimal pricing decisions under each contract. The impact of demand variability and the economic parameters on contract choice are explored through numerical examples. It is shown that no contract type is universally preferred and that operating environments as well as cost-revenue structures have an important effect.

Key Words: call center; outsourcing; subcontracting; contract choice; capacity investment; pricing
History: Received: October 31, 2004;

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