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Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management

Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West Fourth Street, New York, New York 10012
Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West Fourth Street, New York, New York 10012
rcaldent{at}stern.nyu.edu
gvulcano{at}stern.nyu.edu

We analyze a revenue management problem in which a seller facing a Poisson arrival stream of consumers operates an online multiunit auction. Consumers can get the product from an alternative list price channel. We consider two variants of this problem: In the first variant, the list price is an external channel run by another firm. In the second one, the seller manages both the auction and the list price channels.

Each consumer, trying to maximize his own surplus, must decide either to buy at the posted price and get the item at no risk, or to join the auction and wait until its end, when the winners are revealed and the auction price is disclosed.

Our approach consists of two parts. First, we study structural properties of the problem, and show that the equilibrium strategy for both versions of this game is of the threshold type, meaning that a consumer will join the auction only if his arrival time is above a function of his own valuation. This consumer’s strategy can be computed using an iterative algorithm in a function space, provably convergent under some conditions. Unfortunately, this procedure is computationally intensive.

Second, and to overcome this limitation, we formulate an asymptotic version of the problem, in which the demand rate and the initial number of units grow proportionally large. We obtain a simple closed-form expression for the equilibrium strategy in this regime, which is then used as an approximate solution to the original problem. Numerical computations show that this heuristic is very accurate. The asymptotic solution culminates in simple and precise recipes of how bidders should behave, as well as how the seller should structure the auction, and price the product in the dual-channel case.

Key Words: revenue management; online auction; dual channel; strategic behavior; asymptotic analysis
History: Received: February 19, 2004;

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