Management Science
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 53, No. 5, May 2007, pp. 697-712
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0655
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow e-companion
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Anand, K. S.
Right arrow Articles by Girotra, K.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

The Strategic Perils of Delayed Differentiation

Krishnan S. Anand, Karan Girotra

Operations and Information Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Technology and Operations Management, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France

anandk{at}wharton.upenn.edu
karan.girotra{at}insead.edu

The value of delayed differentiation (also known as postponement) for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature. We analyze the case of (imperfectly) competitive markets with demand uncertainty, wherein the choice of supply chain configuration (i.e., early or delayed differentiation) is endogenous to the competing firms. We characterize firms’ choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold, profits, consumer surplus, and welfare. We demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation. In the face of either entry threats or competition, these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation. In fact, under plausible conditions, these effects dominate the traditional risk-pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation, in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms, even under cost parity with delayed differentiation. We extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures, asymmetric markets, and inventory holdback. Our results—in particular that for a broad range of parameter values, early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation—are robust to these relaxations.

Key Words: postponement; commitment; risk pooling; competition; strategy
History: Received: July 12, 2004;


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Management ScienceHome page
R. Anupindi and L. Jiang
Capacity Investment Under Postponement Strategies, Market Competition, and Demand Uncertainty
Management Science, November 1, 2008; 54(11): 1876 - 1890.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Management ScienceHome page
A. Y. Ha and S. Tong
Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
Management Science, April 1, 2008; 54(4): 701 - 715.
[Abstract] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2007 by INFORMS.