Management Science
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 53, No. 2, February 2007, pp. 227-240
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0615
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow e-companion
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Gaur, V.
Right arrow Articles by Park, Y.-H.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

Asymmetric Consumer Learning and Inventory Competition

Vishal Gaur, Young-Hoon Park

Stern School of Business, New York University, Suite 8-160, 44 West Fourth Street, New York, New York 10012
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 330 Sage Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853-6201

vgaur{at}stern.nyu.edu
yp34{at}cornell.edu

We develop a model of consumer learning and choice behavior in response to uncertain service in the marketplace. Learning could be asymmetric, that is, consumers may associate different weights with positive and negative experiences. Under this consumer model, we characterize the steady-state distribution of demand for retailers given that each retailer holds a constant in-stock service level. We then consider a noncooperative game in steady state between two retailers competing on the basis of their service levels. The demand distributions of retailers in this game are modeled using a multiplicative aggregate market-share model in which the mean demands are obtained from the steady-state results for individual purchases, but the model is simplified in other respects for tractability. Our model yields a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that asymmetry in consumer learning has a significant impact on the optimal service levels, market shares, and profits of the retailers. When retailers have different costs, it also determines the extent of competitive advantage enjoyed by the lower-cost retailer.

Key Words: asymmetric consumer learning; customer satisfaction; inventory competition; retail operations
History: Received: June 9, 2004;


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Management ScienceHome page
T. L. Olsen and R. P. Parker
Inventory Management Under Market Size Dynamics
Management Science, October 1, 2008; 54(10): 1805 - 1821.
[Abstract] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2007 by INFORMS.