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MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 46, No. 4, April 2000, pp. 586-596
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.46.4.586.12054
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A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service

Frank Kelly, Richard Steinberg

University of Cambridge, Statistical Laboratory, Cambridge, England CB2 1SB
University of Cambridge, The Judge Institute, Cambridge, England CB2 1AG

f.p.kelly{at}statslab.cam.ac.uk
r.steinberg{at}jims.cam.ac.uk

We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the bidders, allows for multiple winners, and minimizes the possibility of bidder collusion. The procedure is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and thus very efficient to run. The inherent computational complexity of combinatorial bidding cannot be eliminated. However, in this auction the computational burden of evaluating synergies rests with the bidders claiming those synergies, while the auctioneer simply checks that a bid is valid.

Key Words: auctions; combinatorial bidding; universal service; carrier of last resort; telecommunications; synergies



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